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Abstract 
Since 1975, India has built 25 satellites under the satellite programme.  By judicially 
combining the foreign technological imports and local knowledge, India appears to have 
acquired a high level of capabilities to build very complex and world-class satellites for 
remote sensing and communications. This paper analyses the process of technological 
learning in satellite building in India. Particularly, it illustrates the role of foreign imports 
and the local efforts at different phases during this process.  This paper demonstrates that 
achieving the goal of technological self-reliance in a developing country like India, 
particularly in a complex area like satellite systems, is unlikely to be possible without 
significant foreign imports in the formative period.  It also demonstrates that without strong 
indigenous effort India would not have reached threshold capability in the accumulative 
phase. Foreign imports and local knowledge appears to have played a complementary role in 
competence building in satellite technology in India. 
 
Keywords: Technological learning; Technological accumulation; Competence building; 
Indian space programme; Indian satellites; Satellite building; Complex systems; 
Technological imports; Indigenous R&D 
 
 2
1. Introduction 
 
Since early 1980s, there have been a growing interest in the study of the process of acquiring 
technological capabilities in the developing countries, particularly after the successful 
emergence of newly industrialised countries (NICs) in South East Asia (e.g. Kim, 1980, 1987, 
1993, 1996; Westphal et al., 1985; Bell and Scott-Kemmis, 1985; Lall, 1987, 1990; Katz, 
1987; Enos, 1991; Bell and Pavitt, 1993, and Hobday, 1995).  The focus was mainly on the 
process of capability building in relatively less complex industrial technologies.   The 
experience of developing countries showed the important role of imported inputs in the 
process of technology accumulation.   However, as some developing countries such as Korea 
are trying to enter rapidly changing science-based sectors, with increasing technological 
complexity, the process of technological accumulation has become more difficult and 
demanding.  While competence building in complex technologies requires significant foreign 
inputs, international technology transfers in these areas are becoming difficult, as developed 
countries appear to be reluctant and concerned of loosing their competitive advantage.  
However, India’s experience in competence building in satellite technology suggests that 
developing countries need significant foreign inputs to build threshold capabilities in complex 
systems.   It appears that without significant foreign inputs at the formative phase and some 
form of imported inputs at later phases, developing countries are unlikely to succeed in 
building capabilities in complex systems.  
 
Satellite technology is very complex, as mostly satellites are expected to survive between six 
to seven years in the hostile environment of space. They involve components and systems 
with very high reliability.  Even many developed countries do not have the capabilities to 
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manufacture such components and systems; let alone a developing country like India. Very 
few countries are self-sufficient in satellite technology.  However, India appears to have 
successfully accumulated a high level of capabilities in satellite technology, by judicially 
combining both the foreign imports and the local knowledge.  This paper analyses how the 
technological learning in the area of satellite building in India occurred between the early 
1970s and the late 1990s.  It particularly illustrates the role of foreign and local technological 
input in competence building process.  
 
First, the paper gives a brief account of the history of satellite building in India.  Then, it 
discusses in detail the process of competence building during the formative and accumulative 
phases.  Finally, it analyses the importance and impact of foreign imports and local knowledge 
in these phases. 
2. Competence Building in the Formative Phase 
 
The satellite programme is part of the space programme, which started in 1962.  The Indian 
Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is responsible for the programme.  Vikram Sarabhai, 
founder of the space programme, defined the final goal as the acquisition of capabilities to 
build and launch geostationary communication satellites, weather and remote sensing 
satellites.  Between 1975 and 1999, India has built 25 satellites of different kinds (see Table-
1).  The satellite building activities in India can be divided into two phases, that is, the 
formative phase (1971-1985) and the accumulative phase (since 1986).  Figure-1 illustrates 
the activities under these phases.  
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India appears to have followed a step-by-step approach towards technology accumulation.  A 
spacecraft consists of the following major sub-systems: (i) structure, (ii) thermal control 
system,  (iii) spacecraft mechanisms, (iv) power system (v) attitude control system, (vi) 
attitude sensors, (vii) propulsion system (viii) telemetry, tracking and command system, and 
(ix) payloads.  Initially, India started importing whole sub-systems.   Then, it started 
assembling the sub-systems by importing most of the components and developing some 
locally.   Eventually, it started to make most of the sub-systems using mostly local inputs and 
reducing imports to very high precision items, micro-electronic components and advanced 
materials.     
 
India’s quest to master satellite technology began with the setting up of an Experimental 
Satellite Communication Earth Station  (ESCES) at Ahmedabad in 1967. When the 
application of satellites for communication was not widespread, even in the US, Indian space 
scientists believed that they had potential applications for India and tried to demonstrate this 
scientifically. They conducted various experiments on the ground under the Applications 
Technology Satellites Test Plan of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
the US.  They had undertaken a pilot satellite-TV project called Krishi Darshan in January 
1967 covering 80 villages around Delhi (DAE, 1967-68, p.66; 1969-70, p.70).   At the same 
time, India was conducting joint studies with NASA to determine the right system for 
telecommunications and television coverage.  It also sent a team of eight engineers to the US 
in 1969 to conduct joint studies with General Electric and Hughes Aircraft and to gather 
technical data from US and Canadian sources (DAE, 1969-70, p.70).  In the late 1970s, India 
carried out a joint study known as the ISRO-MIT study with the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) in the US, which focused on the optimal systems design and cost estimates 
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of an Indian National Satellite (INSAT).1  In the following year, ISRO initiated detailed 
planning for the telecommunication satellite programme and sent its engineers to NASA for 
training (DAE, 1970-71, p.154). 
 
Meanwhile, ISRO was also learning to build different kinds of payloads for sounding rocket 
experiments.  Payloads constitute the application packages in satellites.  ISRO tested the first 
“completely India built payload” during 1969-70 (DAE, 1969-70, p.71).  Subsequently, it built 
different kinds of payloads for different missions at Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching 
Station (TERLS), and Physical Research Laboratory (PRL) at Ahmedabad.  This included 
meteorological payloads based on British Meteorological Office (BMO) payloads (DAE, 
1970-71, pp. 34-35).  In the early 1970s, Indian engineers, with training in France, started 
developing sensors for airborne remote-sensing surveys and processing of imageries provided 
by NASA.  ISRO also started receiving real time data from American and Canadian scientific 
satellites such as Solrad-9 and 10, S-66, Alouette-11 and ISIS-and II, that were orbiting over 
India (DAE, 1971-72, p.159).  This enhanced the knowledge of Indian scientists.  While doing 
the studies on defining INSAT, ISRO started working on the design and fabrication of a small 
satellite weighing 40 kg and a bigger scientific satellite weighing 350 kg. Thus, the era of 
satellite building began in India. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The influence of this study on the actual definition of INSAT-1 and 2 series operational satellites in the 1980s 
and 1990s is quite evident. 
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2.1. Indian Scientific Satellite – ‘Aryabhata’ 
 
 In 1972, the Academy of Sciences, USSR, agreed to launch a satellite built in India, cost free.  
When the project to build the satellite called as Aryabhata started, there was almost no 
existing infrastructure.  The Satellite Systems Division, consisting of around 200 scientists 
took up the project in the early 1973.  Building Aryabhata proved to be formidable.  In the 
words of Prof. U. R. Rao, project director: “starting from scratch, working day and night 
inside the asbestos roofed sheds with practically no infrastructure” ISRO “had to conceive, 
design, fabricate and test a satellite, in an incredibly short time of just over two and half years” 
(SPACE India, October 1991-March 1992, p.17).  
 
The project employed both foreign imports and local knowledge.  The satellite structure was 
fabricated at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bangalore.  Various tests were carried 
out at the Controllerate of Inspection Electronics (CIL), and the National Aeronautical 
Laboratory (NAL), Bangalore. All together, eight major public enterprises, one large private 
firm and a number of small private firms had worked in the project (Times of India, 12 April 
1975). Most of the equipment needed for fabricating and testing the satellite had to be 
imported (Tribune, 28 May 1975).  Space qualified components that “were specifically 
selected from the preferred parts list of NASA” were imported from various countries (DOSa, 
1972-73, pp. 26-27; Rao, 1978, p.122).  “Practically all the components like transistors and 
chips, used in the satellite, were obtained from abroad” (Hindustan Times, 25 May 1975).  
“The high quality tape recorders, the spin up system, the solar cells, were supplied by the 
Soviet Union.  Instruments needed to conduct the experiments onboard were purchased from 
the US and elsewhere” (Tribune, 28 May 1975). Soviet Union provided a number of 
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subsystems and considerable technical help such assistance for conducting tests on various 
models of the spacecraft, and operating the ground station (Rao, 1978: 129; Times of India, 21 
April 1975).  Finally, India built two flight models of Aryabhata.  It was launched on 19 April 
1975.  Although it faced problems in orbit, it performed better than expected and was in 
operation until 11 April 1981 (Times of India, 12 April 1981).  
 
From Aryabhata, ISRO learned the techniques involved in the design and fabrication of a 
satellite, testing, and quality control.  It gained valuable experience in thermal and power 
control systems, stabilisation and attitude sensor systems, orbital predictions, telemetry, 
tracking and telecommand through in-orbit operations and experiments (Rao, 1978, p.128). 
Aryabhata also helped ISRO to build a “core team of scientific and technical personnel” 
(SPACE India, October 1991-March 1992, p.17).  
 
2.2. Satellites for Earth Observation – ‘Bhaskara I and II’ 
 
After Aryabhata, in 1978, the Soviet Union agreed to launch another Indian satellite, again 
cost free.  The satellite called Bhaskara-I, for earth observation was to be built modifying the 
unused second flight model of Aryabhata.  Thus, ISRO could cut the cost and time.  The 
objectives behind Bhaskara-I were more ambitious. With Aryabhata, the aim was to establish 
the capability to design and fabricate the satellite main bus.  The applications of its payload 
were not considered seriously.  In the case of Bhaskara-I, the immediate goal was to “obtain 
scientific information about meteorology, hydrology, and oceanography, using satellite based 
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sensors” (Times of India, 19 April 1976).  The long-term objective was to evolve an 
operational remote-sensing satellite system for India in future.  
 
In the early 1970s, ISRO started developing methods of remote sensing data analysis using the 
ERTS-1 satellite pictures, provided by NASA.  It also started developing sensors for airborne 
remote sensing.  In 1971-72, Indian engineers had fabricated an infrared scanner in 
collaboration with Laboratories de Meteorology Dynamique in France. By using this 
experience, they constructed an identical scanner  “with the minimum of imported 
components” (DOSa 1971-72, p.184).  ISRO also bought a few Hasselblad 70-mm cameras 
and multiband cameras from the US (DOSa 1972-73, p.42).  Subsequently, ISRO was 
conducting aerial remote sensing surveys in different parts of the country and it set up 
facilities to analyse the data collected from these surveys. The next step in the learning curve 
was to build a remote sensing satellite.  Bhaskara-I provided this opportunity.  
 
 “In an ideal case, an earth observation satellite needs to be three-axis stabilised so that the 
sensors can point towards the earth continuously” (Joseph, 1992, p.25).  However, ISRO 
decided to utilise the standby model of Aryabhata that was only a spinning satellite.  The 
Bhaskara-I project work started in 1975. It was the first major inter-centre effort of ISRO.  
What is known today as ISRO Satellite Centre (ISAC), in Bangalore, was given responsibility 
for the overall project. The design and development of payloads and the responsibility to 
generate data products were given to Space Applications Centre (SAC) at Ahmedabad. The 
responsibility for ground management and operations was assigned to Sriharikota (ISTRAC) 
Centre. Altogether, 14 Indian and 20 Soviet agencies were involved in implementing the 
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project.  Around 400 Indian scientists were involved in the project and it took nearly 4 years 
to complete (Times of India, 08 June 1979; Hindustan Times, 13 June 1978).  A number of 
facilities for the generation of data products, processing of imageries, analysing satellite 
health, receiving data from satellite and testing components and subsystems were established.   
 
The major indigenous effort was the development of the payload that comprised two TV 
cameras and three satellite microwave radiometers (SAMIR).  Overall, about 25 per cent of 
the components were imported (Times of India, 9 June 1979). This included solar cells, Ni-
Cd batteries, space worthy tape recorders, and TV camera systems.  SAC, Ahmedabad 
designed the cameras, and assembled them using imported components from France and the 
US (Patriot, 24 May 1978).  The television tubes were specially made and supplied by 
Thompson-CSF of France (Patriot, 13 July 1979).  As the company made the tubes for the 
first time, it was very keen to see the system successfully employed in space.  Bhaskara-I was 
launched on 07 June 1979. It was expected to last only for 1 year but was operational for 
more than 2 years.  After some initial problems, its TV camera’s started sending pictures, 
which were comparable to those taken by other meteorological satellites such as Nimbus.2   
The TV camera system transmitted nearly 800 images (DOSb, 1981-82, p.50).  
 
As with Aryabhata, Soviet assistance for Bhaskara-I was considerable, especially in carrying 
out the final tests.  A team of 25 Soviet engineers worked with Indian scientists in Bangalore 
from 24 March to 22 April 1978 (Patriot, 24 May 1978).  After Bhaskara-I, the Soviet Union 
agreed to launch another satellite for earth observation, Bhaskara-II.  It also supplied tape 
                                                          
2
 Interview with Prof. Satish Dhawan, former Chairman ISRO, Bangalore. 
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recorders, solar panels, and batteries, besides providing cost free launch.  To reduce cost and 
time, ISRO refurbished the Bhaskara-I proto-type for Bhaskara-II, following the same 
method used with the proto-type of Aryabhata.  Bhaskara-II incorporated major 
improvements in the design and fabrication of payloads and testing and evaluation 
methodologies. Bhaskara-II was launched on 20 November 1981.  Although its Camera-I 
failed, the Camera-2 functioned well and provided more than 2000 pictures (DOSa, 1982-83, 
p.11).  
 
The experience gained from Aryabhata had helped Indian scientists to execute the Bhaskara-I, 
to a large extent without the assistance of Soviet experts.  For example, the Indian and Soviet 
scientists had held just four joint meetings for Bhaskara-I compared to thirteen such meetings 
during the Aryabhata project (Patriot, 24 May 1978).3  Bhaskara-I and II enabled ISRO to 
gain experience in building and operating remote sensing satellites.  ISRO also learned the 
methodologies for data utilisation, real time data processing and orbit and attitude 
determination.   For the first time, it learned about co-ordination and management of a satellite 
project involving many space centres, firms and other organisations. 
 
2.3. Experimental Communication Satellite -- (APPLE) 
 
To define an appropriate operational communication satellite system for India, ISRO had 
undertaken extensive ground experiments using foreign satellites.  During 1975-76, the 
Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) was conducted extensively, using an 
                                                          
3
 From Interview with Prof. N. Noviko, vice-president of Intercosmos, USSR Academy of Science. 
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American satellite ATS-6.  Then the Satellite Telecommunications Experimental Project 
(STEP) was carried out between 1977 and 1979 by using the Franco-German satellite, 
Symphonie.  These activities culminated in design and fabrication of an experimental geo-
stationary communication satellite called the Ariane Passenger Payload Experiment 
(APPLE).  Through this project ISRO took “really a quantum jump” in many aspects of 
satellite building.4  It was not part of ISRO’s original space plan.  It was the result of an 
unexpected offer from European Space Agency (ESA) to launch an Indian geo-stationary 
communication satellite by using one of its Ariane test launchers, cost free.  ESA made this 
offer because of ISRO’s collaboration in the development of Viking liquid engine for 
Ariane.  
 
The objectives of APPLE were to gain experience in designing, fabricating and testing a 3-
axis stabilised communication satellite.  A communications satellite is one of the most 
complex and difficult to fabricate. It carries its own propulsion system and it has to go through 
a series of development manoeuvres in orbit.  At the time, only few countries such as the US, 
USSR, the UK and France-Germany (combined) were capable of building communication 
satellites. Therefore, it was a formidable task for a country like India that built its first satellite 
only in 1975.5  ISRO had to set up various fabrications and test facilities in different space 
centres, as APPLE was a different class of satellite from Aryabhata or Bhaskara. These 
                                                          
4
 Interview with Kiran Karnik, Former ISRO scientist, Space Applications Centre (SAC), Ahmedabad.  
 
5
 Prof. Roy Gibson, Director General of ESA, visited ISRO when APPLE was being constructed at the Peenya 
Industrial Estate in Bangalore. Seeing the asbestos sheds and witnessing how the work was being done, he was 
not at all impressed and he expressed his doubts about ISRO’s ability to meet the launch schedule.  Satish 
Dhawan, then chairman of ISRO, assured him that it would be ready for the launch. To allay further doubts, 
ISRO gave a dummy block of APPLE to ESA so that Ariane could be launched if APPLE were not ready.   
Ironically, APPLE was completed seven months before the actual launch, and the launch was delayed by ESA’s 
satellite, a co-passenger to APPLE (Interview with Dhawan and U.R. Rao). 
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facilities were set up using both indigenous and foreign equipment and components (DOSb, 
1978-79, pp.53-54).  
 
An important development under this project was the involvement of the industry.  Because of 
the tight time schedule, ISRO was forced to subcontract fabrication work to industry and other 
R&D institutions, wherever possible.  The fabrication of APPLE’s structure was carried out 
by HAL. The fabrication of PCB’s was done by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), and Hegde 
& Golay, Bangalore.  Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) and CIL provided the 
component screening services.  Many other firms and institutes such as Indian Institute of 
Technology (IITs), Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Babha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) 
and Solid State Physical Laboratory (SSPL) and NAL also were involved (DOSb, 1980-81, 
p.61).  
 
Various models were developed and tested both in India and abroad. The thermal model was 
tested at SOPMER’s facility in Toulouse, France.  The engineering model was tested by ESA 
at Les Meureause, France.  The critical design review and the analysis of the major results of 
engineering, thermal and structural model tests were jointly undertaken by ISRO and ESA 
(DOSb, 1979-80, pp.74-75).  The short launch schedule forced ISRO to imports most of the 
items required, as indigenous development would take longer than the launch schedule.  ISRO 
imported most of the critical components and sub systems such as momentum wheel, solar 
array drive, reaction control system, batteries, sensors, and transponders elements, ground 
check out equipment, travelling wave tube and titanium gas bottles (DOSa, 1978-79, p.9; 
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Patriot, 23 July 1981; Financial Express, 29 July 1981).6  ISRO also indigenously developed 
certain items like momentum wheel assembly, solar array drive, deployment mechanisms, C-
band antenna and C-band communication payload (DOSb, 1979-80, p.75).  Further, it started 
indigenous development of many of the items imported for APPLE project to meet the needs 
of future satellite projects.   
 
From APPLE, ISRO learned to design, fabricate, test and evaluate various sub-systems 
involved in a communication satellite.  It learned new techniques like 3-axis body 
stabilisation, Apogee booster motor (ABM) firing, thruster firing, solar panel and antennae 
deployment.  It gained new expertise by using C-band transponders for different kinds of 
experiments. It was able to test indigenously developed technologies such as momentum 
wheel, Sun and Earth sensors, graphite antenna, and solid propulsion ABM.  ISRO engineers 
gained experience in manoeuvring a satellite from a geo-stationary transit orbit to the geo-
stationary orbit.7  
 
2.4. Procurement of INSAT-1 Satellites from the US 
With the launching of Bhaskara-II and APPLE, the experimental phase ended.  In the next 
phase, the objective was to build two satellite systems -- the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite 
system (IRS) and the Indian National Satellite system (INSAT), for commercial operations.  
The question confronting ISRO was whether it could build them indigenously and provide 
                                                          
6
 The solar panels were bought from Spectrolab, USA, Ni-Cd batteries from Saft of France, sensors form 
Lockheed, Control systems from Hamilton Standard, Microwave components from Hughes International, Solar 
array drive from British Aerospace, and one momentum wheel assembly from Teldix of West Germany. 
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them to user agencies on a continuous basis.  Any discontinuity would seriously affect 
services like telecommunication and TV broadcasting in the country.  ISRO realised that 
though it was confident about building operational commercial systems indigenously, it might 
take more time than stipulated to develop them.  However, it viewed remote sensing and 
communications separately.  After a realistic appraisal of its capabilities, It decided to build 
the IRS-1 series indigenously and buy the INSAT-1 series from abroad.  It decided to build the 
INSAT-2 series indigenously.  There were reasons behind these decisions.  As INSATs were 
communications satellites, they were more complex and ISRO needed longer development 
time. Further, as it was a high priority area, ISRO was not willing to take any risks.  In 
contrast, the risks involved in building IRS-1s locally were considered to be low.  Because, 
India was already receiving data directly from foreign satellites, such as LANDSAT (NASA) 
and SPOT (France), which could be provided to users in case of problems with IRS-1s.8  
 
In 1977, ISRO finally defined INSAT as a multipurpose system consisting of 
telecommunication, meteorological and TV broadcasting elements.  It was the world’s first 
geo-stationary satellite system to combine these three elements, and it remains unique even 
today.  During 1978-79, the Department of Space (DOS) entered into a contract with Ford 
Space and Commerce Corporation (FSCC) of USA for the supply of two INSAT-1 spacecraft, 
and the equipment for the Satellite Control Centre (SCC) at the Master Control Facility 
(MCF) in India. The satellites were to be designed by Ford to ISRO’s specifications. ISRO 
also concluded an agreement with NASA to launch the satellites on a commercial basis. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7
 This is an extremely difficult manoeuvre.  Before India, only the US, Soviet Union, France, and Canada had 
demonstrated this capability.  
 
8
 Interview with D. V. Raju, Former Deputy Director, National Remote Sensing Agency, Hyderabad. 
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Indian engineers worked with their counterparts at the Ford Aerospace for five years.  They 
monitored the implementation of the contracts.  Barring one or two, most of the team stayed 
in batches.9  They acquired experience in two aspects: project management, and testing and 
integration procedures.  The project management was related to the process of building a 
complex spacecraft like INSAT-1.  In Ford’s case, it was about managing sub-contractors.  In 
ISRO’s case, it was about managing various space centres, other R&D organisations and firms 
in India.  Therefore, the learning was in terms of managerial techniques, systems control and 
systems engineering and documentation.  Regarding testing, the learning concerned the kinds 
of tests, how they were carried out, and how problems were analysed.  Further, ISRO 
engineers also brought back to India a wealth of technical data.10  From INSAT-1s, ISRO also 
gained considerable experience in failure analysis and in-orbit manoeuvres, as three of the 
four satellites faced post-launch problems.  This subsequently helped ISRO in building the 
INSAT-2 satellites. 
3. Competence Building in the Accumulative Phase 
 
The period beginning from the mid-1980s could be considered as the accumulative phase.  By 
the mid-1980s, ISRO has attained threshold capability to build locally both remote sensing 
and communications satellites (IRS-1s and INSAT-2s), within comparable time scale, for 
commercial operations.  However, it was still dependent on foreign countries for some critical 
components and materials.  These satellites were more sophisticated and complex than the 
                                                          
9
 Interview with D. V. Raju. 
 
10
 Interview with a former ISRO engineer. 
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older generation and they required very advanced microelectronics components and materials.  
For this, India was largely dependent on the Western countries.   At the same time, it was 
becoming increasingly difficult to import many of them because of the restrictions imposed by 
export controls.  This appears to have forced ISRO to strategically manage the indigenous 
R&D to avoid dependence on foreign countries for critical items.11  
3.1. Indian Remote Sensing Satellites (IRS) 
The IRS-1A project was begun in June 1982 and it took much longer to develop IRS-1A than 
had been expected.  ISRO had to set up certain facilities like a 3-meter thermo-vacuum 
chamber, scene simulators, charge coupled devices (CCD) calibration set up, satellite interface 
simulator, and data acquisition and analysis set-up (DOSa 1985-86, p.19).  By early 1984, 
several major subsystems such as the reaction control system, reaction wheels, vertical 
sensors, horizon sensors, communication systems and vital components of the camera were 
developed indigenously by various ISRO centres (DOSa, 1982-83, p.12).  Subsequently, solar 
array drive mechanism, altitude reference system, and slip ring unit for the solar array drive 
assembly also were indigenously developed (DOSa, 1983-84, p.22).  These activities clearly 
indicate ISRO’s thrust towards achieving total indigenisation in the area of spacecraft control 
systems.  This is a critical area of satellite technology and some of the components discussed 
above face export controls.  Therefore, it is likely that India decided to develop them 
indigenously to avoid export control problems.   
 
IRS-1A’s cameras involved an entirely new technology in remote sensing sensors.  When 
ISRO started planning IRS-1A’s main features, the remote sensing satellites used only opto-
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mechanical scanners like the Landsat-MSS and TM for multispectral imaging.  In June 1983, 
Linear Imaging Self-scanning Sensor (LISS) using CCD in the push broom mode was flight 
tested on board the shuttle flight STS-7 in a German Experimental Earth Observation 
programme, MOMS.  At the time, France was also planning to use such a camera for SPOT.  
In India, a single-band CCD camera for aircraft platform was designed and flight-tested in 
1980.  Another sensor using a linear photo diode array was flown on its ROHINI-D1 satellite 
in June 1981.  Using these experiments, ISRO was able to do a comparative study of the opto-
mechanical scanner and the LISS and decided to use solid state CCD cameras in IRS-IA.  The 
experience gained from using the LANDSAT data (NASA) helped ISRO in deciding to 
employ the LISS payloads with two different spatial resolutions (DOSa, 1983-84, pp.30-32).  
 
IRS-1A was launched on 17 March 1988 by a Soviet launcher.  The satellite was designed to 
operate for three years only, but it continued to operate long after its expected life. The 
performances of its cameras were “very good, producing very high quality imaging” and there 
was “no deterioration of performance even after the design life of three years” (Joseph, 1992, 
p.35).  A number of new technologies incorporated in the satellite such as large area solar 
panel, reaction wheels and gyroscopes, hydrazine-based reaction control system, S-band and 
X-band communication systems, a variety of solar, earth and stars sensors, “have performed to 
specification much beyond the expected life of the satellite” (DOSb, 1993-94, p.18).  The 
quality of imagery received from IRS-1A was comparable to LANDSAT-D (Patriot, 16 
March 1988).12  Unlike the cases of Aryabhata, Bhaskara-I and II, the Soviet technical 
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 Interview with Kiran Karnik. 
12
 By December 1992, IRS -1A provided 450,000 images, which had been disseminated, to over 700 users.  
ISRO has been paying US$600,000 every year simply to get access to Landsat data plus a separate fee for every 
picture actually used 
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assistance in IRS-1A was “equal to zero,” except for the launch services on a commercial 
basis (Patriot, 16 March 1988).  Most of the technology involved was indigenous and some 
critical components and subsystems, such as CCD and the imaging lenses, were imported 
(DOSb, 1984-85, p.22) 
 
Following IRS-1A, IRS-1B and IRS-1C were built and launched in 1991 and 1995 
respectively.  IRS-1B was identical to IRS-1A with some improvements.  IRS-1C is 
considered as “one of the best remote sensing satellite systems available compared to any 
other civilian operational remote sensing satellite system” (Joseph, 1992, pp.36-37).  Its “data 
is marketed world wide through a tie-up between ANTRIX and the EOSAT Corporation of 
the USA” (ISRO, 1996, p.1). IRS-1D was identical to IRS-1C.  It was launched by the 
indigenously built Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV)-C1 on 29 September 1997.  
Between 1994 and 1999, India has built IRS-P2, IRS-P3, and IRS-P4 remote sensing satellites 
and launched successfully by PSLVs.  This enabled India to operate “the world’s largest 
constellation” of civilian remote sensing satellites (DOSa, 1997-98, p.7).  Data from IRS 
satellites have been acquired under commercial agreements by a number of countries 
including North American and European countries, Japan, Korea, Thailand and Dubai (DOSa, 
1998-99, p.5).  
 
3.2. INSAT-2 Satellites 
 
The experience gained from APPLE and INSAT-1s, particularly the post-launch difficulties 
with INSAT-1s, had helped ISRO in developing the INSAT-2s.  These satellites were nearly 
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twice bigger and much advanced than INSAT-1s.  INSAT-2 project was started in 1985. ISRO 
had to build various facilities including the Large Space Simulation Chamber (LSSC) to test 
satellites of 4-m width and 5m height and an 1100 m3 acoustic chamber.  LSSC can simulate –
173 C and provide hard vacuum (hundred thousandth of a millibar) and solar radiation 
conditions.  Only about half a dozen such facilities exist around the world (The Hindu, 1 July 
1992).  ISRO developed indigenously a number of critical subsystems, components and 
materials such as communication and VHRR payloads, liquid ABM, unified propulsion 
system, reaction control thrusters, solar array, nearly all sensors for attitude and orbit controls, 
carbon-fibre antenna, titanium pressurant tanks, Nickel-Cadmium cells, inertial systems such 
as reaction wheel, momentum wheel, solar array drive, and miniature inertial reference unit. 
composite elements, various alloys and alloy forging (DOSb, 1997-98, p.46-54).  However, 
ISRO was also dependent on imports for a number of items. They included radiation hardened 
integrated circuits (ICs), solar cells for solar arrays, sensors, infra-red and visible channel 
detectors and highly polished beryllium mirrors for VHRR, cells for nickel-cadmium 
batteries, thermal blankets to maintain the satellite temperature regime, light-weight, high 
precision and high reliability parts, such as propellant tanks for ABM and mirco-thrusters, 
micro-processor for attitude and orbit control system, and microwave transistors (The Hindu, 
01 July 1992; India Today, 30 September 1992, p.145; DOSa, 1986-87, p.15).13   
 
India built four INSAT-2 satellites and except INSAT2-D, others were successful after launch. 
INSAT-2C was qualitatively different from 2A or 2B, especially regarding the payload.  The 
successful launch of INSAT-2A, 2B, and 2C clearly demonstrated India’s capability to build 
                                                          
13
 The Momentum Wheel and propellant tanks were from Teldix and MBB of Germany respectively. The 
microprocessor was bought from Harris, USA; the ICs from SGS-Thompson, France; and microwave transistors 
were from NEC and Fujitsu, Japan.  
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complex and sophisticated communication satellites. Some capacity of the next satellite in the 
series, INSAT-2E, already has been leased to INTELSAT (DOSa, 1996-97, p.19).  Since late-
1990s, ISRO has started building the next generation communication satellites, the 3.5 tonne 
class INSAT-3 satellites.  Already it has built the INSAT-3B.  It clearly shows that India 
acquired a high level of capabilities that are comparable to other nations that are more 
advanced in this field. 
 
3.3. Exports 
 
Since mid-1990s, India has been selling remote sensing data to a number of countries through 
Space Imaging-EOSAT, an American company.  India also started exporting to the US and 
European companies a small number of sub-systems and components like shaft assemblies, 
pressure transducers, fill and drain valves, solar wing actuators and hinge assemblies, C-band 
receive and transmit filter assemblies, magnetic torquer rods, reaction wheel assemblies with 
drive control electronics, solar array drive assembly with electronics and software packages.   
India has established a Telemtry Control and Ranging (TCR) station for World Space Inc., the 
US, to provide in-orbit support for its satellite systems.  It also provided technical and 
consultancy services to Korea for its spacecraft mission control system, and telemetry, 
tracking and command services to PanAmsat and Systems Loral, the US (DOSa, 1997-98, 
p.81; 1998-99, pp.84-85; DOSb, 1997-98, p.48).  
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4. Role of Foreign Imports and Indigenous Efforts in Technology Accumulation 
 
The main objective of India’s satellite programme was to achieve capability to build 
commercial scale satellites for remote sensing and communications.  For this, it required to 
accumulate skills in the areas of design, various analysis, fabrication, testing, integration and 
spacecraft control.  It also had to establish various ground facilities.  Despite following ‘self-
reliance’ policy, from the beginning, India considered foreign collaboration was necessary to 
learn these skills from advanced countries.  Dhawan, former chairman of ISRO argued:  
“simply saying nationalistically that we will do it ourselves, we will land in all kinds of 
problems…industrially we are a small country.  We cannot afford…” to do every thing 
indigenously.14  At the same time Indian scientists were fully aware that they had to make 
strong and sustained efforts to develop locally whatever technologies they could by employing 
available resources.  In the early 1970s, India’s capability in all aspects of satellite technology 
was nearly zero.  By the late 1990s, it has acquired capabilities to build 3-tonne class satellites 
and started exporting satellite data products, spacecraft sub-systems and components in a 
small scale.  India reached this position by judiciously combining local effort with foreign 
collaboration.   This is illustrated by the Figure-2.   
 
This paper clearly showed that foreign collaboration appears to have played a very significant 
role during the formative phase of competence building, that is, until the mid-1980s (see 
Table-2).  In the area of remote sensing satellites the Soviet Union was the foreign actor 
                                                          
14
 Interview with Dhawan. 
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while, in the case of communications satellite, it was the US and the European countries, 
particularly France.  Under the Aryabhata, Bhaskara-I and Bhaskara-II projects, India learned 
how to design, fabricate and test a spinning low-earth orbit satellite.   Under the APPLE and 
the INSAT-1 projects, India learned a number of techniques involved in building and 
operating geo-stationary, 3-axis stabilised communication satellites.  During this period, it 
appears that India was able to import almost anything needed for its programme without 
hindrance.  At the same time, it was clearly evident that India was making strong efforts 
indigenously to develop all the components it could by using existing knowledge and 
capabilities.  
 
This paper also demonstrated the predominant role of local efforts during the accumulative 
phase, that is, since the mid-1980s.   It is clear that India’s dependence on foreign imports has 
significantly declined during the IRS-1 and INSAT-2 projects (see Table-3).  The 
developments under these projects suggest that due to export controls India started planning 
and managing its indigenous efforts in a manner so as to reduce dependence on foreign 
countries for most critical items.  During this period, India appears to have accumulated a high 
level of capabilities in the areas of design, fabrication, testing, integration and spacecraft 
control.  It has also established world class facilities for spacecraft simulation, testing, and 
various analyses.  Overall, India appears to have achieved threshold capabilities in satellite 
building by the mid-1980s.  Therefore, it is likely that the role of foreign technological inputs 
in competence building in future may decline further. 
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The major factor, which helped India to gradually reduce foreign technical assistance and 
import appears to be the emergence of a technological partnership among ISRO, other R&D 
institutions, universities, and industry (see Figure-3).  Leading scientists such as Sarabhai and 
Dhawan actively fostered local firms in both public and private sectors and forged linkages 
with other R&D and academic institutions such as Council of Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) laboratories, IISc, IITs and universities. With a steady increase in the 
number of new projects since the mid-1970s, the demand for supplies also has increased. 
ISRO was not in a position to meet all of them by in-house effort.  Therefore, ISRO started 
developing local firms to meet as much demands as possible.   
 
ISRO has fostered a network of supplier firms through applied R&D, proto-type development, 
technology transfer, training, sharing of information and facilities, and quality management 
systems.  ISRO and in some cases other R&D organisations provided the ‘know-how’ to 
firms, which either was developed locally or absorbed from a foreign source.  The firms were 
involved in development and engineering (D&E), R&D related to production problems, and 
final production. The ‘know-why’ and the basic research remained under the domain of ISRO, 
other R&D organisations and academic institutions.   By the late 1990s, ISRO has transferred 
231 technologies to the firms and over 500 small, medium, and large firms, from both public 
and private sectors, were involved in the space programme (DOSa, 1998-99, p.82).  Some of 
the large firms have established separate space divisions to meet ISRO’s demands.  
Simultaneously, ISRO also developed linkages with universities through a programme known 
as Sponsored Research (RESPOND) and brought in other public R&D institutions.  
Gradually, it has helped to forge linkages among firms and between various institutions.  
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The wider technology diffusion through creation of strong linkages between ISRO, other 
R&D performing organisations, academic institutions and firms appears to have helped India 
to accumulate a high level of capabilities in space technology.  The trend of its exports 
suggests that India would have to depend on foreign collaborations to enter the international 
market in this area.  It is very unlikely that India would become a competitor to other 
developed countries in this area.  On the other hand, it is likely to complement their 
capabilities by collaborating with them at sub-contacting level (DOSa, 1997-98, p.81, 1998-
99, pp. 84-85).15  Further, it is also likely that with increasing complexity of its next 
generation satellite projects, India will continue to depend on foreign imports for high 
precision and micro-electronic components, materials and advanced equipment for ground 
facilities.  This suggests that competence building in complex systems in a developing country 
would continue to depend on considerable foreign technological inputs, even after it reached 
threshold level.   Also, India’s experience suggests that for entering international market in the 
area of complex systems, which is very competitive, a developing country may have to forge 
foreign collaborations.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has shown that since 1975, India has accumulated a high level of capabilities to 
build world class remote sensing and communications satellites.  India’s experience in 
satellite technology has shown that the importance of foreign technological imports varies at 
different periods during the process of building capabilities.  This paper clearly demonstrated 
                                                          
15
 This trend is clearly discernible as space organisations and companies in the US, France, the UK, Germany, 
Japan and Korea are showing interest in India’s capabilities in spacecraft and launch vehicle systems.  
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that foreign technological inputs played a major role during the formative phase (from the 
early-1960s to mid-1980s) and it considerably diminished during the accumulative phase 
(from the mid-1980s).  However, the evidence demonstrated the importance of foreign 
technological imports for competence building in a developing country during all phases.  
Although they are less important in the accumulative phase than in the formative phase, their 
role is still considerable during the accumulative phase. This shows that foreign technological 
inputs in some form are indispensable to a developing country for building capabilities in 
complex systems such as space technology.   It appears from this case study that technological 
self-sufficiency cannot be achieved without foreign inputs in some form.  Even after reaching 
threshold level, competence building in complex systems in a developing country is likely to 
depend on considerable foreign inputs on a continuous basis. 
 
This paper has also shown that without strong indigenous effort India’s capability in satellite 
technology would not have grown to the present level. It is possible that Indian satellite 
programme might have failed even if foreign technological imports had been ‘freely’ 
available, because it is unlikely to have met with success without the necessary local effort 
and knowledge.  The evidence in this paper has shown that both internal and external 
knowledge played important roles in competence building.  The rate of technological 
accumulation achieved at a given time seems to have been decided by the combination of 
these factors.  
 
The general observation from this paper is that both external and internal knowledge appear to 
play important role in competence building.  However, the importance of foreign inputs and 
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the indigenous efforts varies at different phases during this process.  The foreign inputs may 
play a major role during the initial phase while indigenous R&D may play an important role 
during the later phase.  Both appear to be very effective in influencing the pace of capability 
building when they are combined, particularly in the case of complex technologies.  
Therefore, internal and external knowledge appear to play a complementary role in building 
technological capabilities.  In other words, both foreign imports and local effort are necessary 
for building capabilities in complex systems in a developing country. 
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design and fabrication of payloads, nearly total capability in testing,
integration, QC, project management and emergence of a strong
network of R&D and academic institutions, and supplier firms.
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Table 1: Satellites Built by ISRO Since 1970s 
 
Satellite Weight (Kg) Date of Launch Launched By 
Aryabhata 360 April 1975 Intercosmos (USSR)^ 
Bhaskara I 444 June 1979 Intercosmos (USSR)^ 
Rohini 35 August 1979 SLV-3 (India)* 
Rohini-I 35 July 1980 SLV-3 
Rohini-D1 32 May 1981 SLV-3 
APPLE 650 June 1981 Ariane Test Launch (ESA)^ 
Bhaskara II 436 November 1981 Intercosmos (USSR)^ 
Rohini-D2 41.5 April 1983 SLV-3 (India) 
SROSS-1 150 March 1987 ASLV-D (India)* 
IRS-1A 975 March 1988 Vostok (USSR) 
SROSS-2 150 July 1988 ASLV-D2 (India)* 
IRS-1B 975 August 1991 Vostok (USSR) 
SROSS-C1 106 May 1992 ASLV-D3 (India) 
INSAT-2A 1906 July 1992 Ariane (ESA) 
INSAT-2B 1906 July 1993 Ariane (ESA) 
IRS-1E 846 September 1993 PSLV-D1 (India)* 
SROSS-C2 113 May 1994 ASLV-D4 (India) 
IRS-P2 804 October 1994 PSLV-D2 (India) 
IRS-1C 1250+ December 1995 Molniya (Russia) 
INSAT-2C 2050+ December 1995 Ariane (ESA) 
IRS-P3 922 March 1996 PSLV-D3 (India) 
INSAT-2D 2500 June 1997 Ariane (ESA)* 
IRS-1D 1200 September 1997 PSLV-C1 (India) 
IRS-P4 1050 May 1999 PSLV-C2 (India) 
INSAT-3B 3500 March 2000  
(to be launched) 
Ariane-5 (ESA)  
* Launch Failed; ^ Cost Free Launch; + Weighed at lift-off. 
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Table 2: Balance Between Imported and Local Technological Inputs 
in the Formative Phase 
Period and Projects Foreign Imports Local Inputs 
 
 
 
I. Late 1960s and 
Early 1970s -   
 
            Before Aryabhata  
 
(a) Joint Experiments and training with 
NASA. 
(b) Joint studies with NASA, General 
Electric and Hughes Aircraft, and 
MIT to design INSAT. 
(c) Assistance from French space 
agency-CNES, to develop infrared 
scanner and supply of components.  
(d) Direct data reception from the US 
and Canadian satellites. 
(e) Imported remote sensing cameras 
from the US. 
(a) Ground experiments such as 
pilot satellite-TV project. 
(b) Designing and Building different 
kinds of small payloads for 
sounding rocket experiments. 
(c) Designing small satellites. 
(d) Setting up small ground facilities 
 
 
 
II. 1973-1975:  
 
              Aryabhata  
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Imported most of fabrication and 
testing equipment; almost all 
subsystems, components and 
instruments used for experiments in 
the satellite. 
(b) Significant technical assistance from 
the Soviet Union for design studies 
and testing various models of the 
spacecraft and spacecraft control. 
(c) Cost free launch by the Soviet Union. 
(a) Major part of satellite design. 
(b) Fabrication of the satellite main 
bus. Assembling the system and 
sub-systems. 
(c) Quality control at component 
level. 
(d) Setting up basic infrastructure, 
including training the core team 
of scientists. 
(e) Developing local firms as sub-
contractors and suppliers.  
 
 
 
III. 1975-1981:  
 
(a) SITE and STEP  
(b) Bhaskara I and 
Bhaskara II 
(c) APPLE 
 
 
 
 
(a) The US, France and Germany 
provided satellites for experiments. 
NASA and British Aircraft 
Corporation provided design, training 
and testing assistance.  
(b) Imported about 25 per cent 
components for Bhaskara I and II. 
(c) Soviet assistance in final tests and 
free launch. 
(d) ESA assistance for design, testing, 
and free launching of APPLE. 
(e) Imported most of critical components 
and sub-systems. 
 
(a) Supplied most ground 
equipment.   
(b) Design and development of 
payload for Bhaskara I and II. 
(c) Design and fabrication of main 
bus and sub-systems using 
imported components. 
(d) Development of technological 
partnership involving firms and 
various institutions.  
(e) Development of non-critical sub-
systems for APPLE. 
(f) Initiated local development of 
most of imported critical items. 
 
 
 
 
IV. 1979-1990 
 
             INSAT-1s 
(a) Ford Space and Commerce 
Corporation designed, built, and 
supplied INSAT-1s and equipment 
for satellite control centre.  It 
imparted project management, 
testing, integration and 
documentation skills. 
(b) Failure analysis by NASA. 
(a) Design specifications for 
INSAT-1 and project co-
ordination with Ford. 
(b) Failure analysis 
(c) Spacecraft control 
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Table 3: Balance Between Imported and Local Technological Inputs 
in the Accumulative Phase 
 
Period and Projects Foreign Imports Local Inputs 
 
 
 
I. Mid 1980s to Mid 
1990s  
   
 
           IRS-1A to IRS-1D  
 
 
 
(a) Import of limited equipment and 
components for setting up ground 
facilities.  
(b) Some critical components and sub-
systems such as Charge coupled 
devices (CCD) and imaging lenses 
were imported. 
(c) Imported solar panels and cells for 
nickel-cadmium (Ni-Cd) batteries. 
(d) Unlike the Aryabhata, Bhaskara I and 
II, nearly total absence of Soviet 
assistance.  
 
(a) Setting up facilities such as 
simulators, environmental 
chambers, calibration facilities 
with mostly local supplies.  
(b) Major indigenisation effort was 
taken.  Most of the sub-systems 
and some critical components 
such as reaction control system, 
reaction wheels, attitude 
reference system, solar array 
drive mechanism, and various 
sensors were developed locally. 
(c) Indigenously made solar cells, 
Ni-Cd batteries. 
(d) Indigenous propulsion system-a 
hydrazine based Reaction 
control system (RCS). 
 
 
 
 
II. Mid 1980s-Mid 
1990s:  
 
INSAT-2A to 
INSAT-2D  
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Imported a number of critical items 
below sub-system level such as solar 
cells, highly polished beryllium 
mirrors, cells for nickel-cadmium 
batteries and thermal blankets.   
(b) Imported microelectronic 
components and advanced material 
and high precision parts such as 
radian hardened integrated circuits 
(ICs), micro-processor for attitude 
and orbit control system, microwave 
transistors and titanium propellant 
tanks for Apogee booster motor 
(ABM) and microthrusters.  
  
(a) World class facilities such as 
Large Space Simulation and 
Acoustic chambers were built by 
using largely local knowledge 
and resources. 
(b) Number of critical sub-systems 
such as communication and 
VHRR payloads, liquid ABM, 
reaction control thrusters, solar 
array and carbon-fibre antenna. 
(c)  Nearly all sensors for attitude 
and orbit control, inertial 
systems and Ni-Cd cells. 
 
 
 
III.  Since Late 1990s 
 
(a) Next Generation 
IRSs and 
INSATs 
(b) Exports 
 
 
 
 
(a) Importing certain microelectronic 
and high precision components and 
advanced materials. 
(b) Small number of imported equipment 
for ground facilities 
(a) Indigenous capability in most 
areas at sub-systems level and to 
some extent component level. 
(b) Nearly total indigenous 
capability in ground facilities. 
(c) Selling satellite data, providing 
satellite transponders on lease, 
exporting components and sub-
systems for spacecraft systems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
